

THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

National Intelligence Officers

SP - 110/81
29 April 1981

MEMO FOR: Doug MacEachin
OSR/C/SEC

FROM: NIO/SP

25X1

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

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A week or so ago I talked to [REDACTED] about [REDACTED]. I told him that my impression was that the folks in your shop felt his contribution had been useful and that he should be retained as a part-time consultant. I asked him if he was interested in assuming the cost of [REDACTED] efforts. He said no, and I passed that message along to John Steinbrenner. The result was the letter from John, which is attached.

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After you read the letter, you will see that the prospect of keeping [REDACTED] depends on either my persuading Andy Marshall to get the Pentagon to be more generous (unlikely), or getting CIA to assume the expense. In either case I can act only if Rae Huffstutler supports it. So it seems to me you and [REDACTED] need to decide whether you should try to change Rae's mind or whether [REDACTED] contribution is only marginally useful and should not be sustained. Let me know how you come out.

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[REDACTED]
Dave Brandwein

Attachment

Page Denied

April 27, 1981

Mr. David Brandwein
National Intelligence Officer
for Strategic programs
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear David:

I am afraid the question of [] status has become
another degree more complicated.

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The Pentagon cannot write a personal services contract for someone who is also a consultant. In order to handle the travel reimbursement problem (about \$5,000 in the course of a year) they will have to write a personal services contract for both his time and his travel and that will definitely alter his legal status. They are in principle willing to undertake that but are worried about the effect it might have on his access to information. Moreover, since I informed them that CIA had in effect declined to pay for him themselves, they have raised the question whether the entire arrangement is really justified. I can testify on that point only in substantive terms. I cannot represent your actual interest in the arrangement. As a practical matter, therefore, there will have to be some discussion between you and Andy Marshall if this is to proceed, and I am best removed from the loop.

My sense now is that administrative convenience is likely to prevail and that the arrangement will be allowed to lapse because of its inherent awkwardness. There is something inevitable about that given that the original parties to the understanding at CIA have now all retired and that we are now into the second change in administrations since the arrangement was instituted. I bow gracefully to that logic, but as a parting word let me at least say what I think you will lose.

[] is a gadfly with a passion for detail and a long personal history in the business of strategic assessments. He has a habit of opening up old analytic issues that were bypassed rather than resolved as the current intelligence process rolled by them. Because the issues he has been working on have strong resonance with current questions and because the evidence he brings to bear and the lines of argument he pursues are not available elsewhere, he is very stimulating to the

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working analysts around him. There have been some concrete results from this stimulation. In at least two recent instances of which I am aware, he brought about major revisions of important points of fact in official publications by using historical evidence systematically. The necessary revisions were accomplished, as best I can judge, very quietly and gracefully with neither praise or blame being spewed about. This is as it should be in a professional intelligence organization, but it does require that one watch very carefully lest the value of what has happened be obscured by necessary discreetness. Higher level managers are prone to misjudging that value. For them old issues and unconventional lines of argument are potential trouble and they will be the first to worry about the fuss that might be caused and the last to accept the value that has been received.

These immediate effects on the current working analysts and their products provide the most demonstrable utility, but I believe there are much deeper and much more important matters at stake. [] represents a type of asset that the Agency has been gradually losing over recent years. He is a member of the generation that created modern strategic assessment and that personally experienced the development of both Soviet forces and of our own analysis of those forces. His own memory and experience help compensate for the strong tendency for current analysts to concentrate their efforts in a narrow slice of time around the present moment. Because of the process of turnover in personnel, most working analysts do not know much about critical formative experiences in the Soviet strategic program that happened more than a few years ago. The files and archives are not organized to give them this information. Unless they know the important questions to ask they will never get it. [] supplies those questions and the critical information necessary to get started.

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
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I cannot emphasize too strongly how important systematic access to the past will be in facing coming intelligence problems and how deficient the current production process is in that regard. We are entering a period in which highly sophisticated assessments of the Soviet program will be urgently required by American policymakers and these will have to penetrate much deeper than the standard presentations of basic technical capability and highly generalized doctrine. Systematic exploitation of intelligence observations extending back over 20 years is the single most powerful means of achieving that sophistication. Some excellent individuals are making some promising efforts and fortunately this entire cause does not depend upon [] alone. In my opinion, however, the Agency's capability in this regard is enormously underdeveloped relative to its importance; that fact is not widely appreciated; and you can ill afford to lose even one person who does appreciate it.

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SIAI

With this I retire from the issue. As you can tell I feel very strongly about it and remain willing to do anything that would be helpful. It seems to me, however, that I have done all that I can constructively and properly do at my own initiative, and I must leave the matter in your hands.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'John Steinbruner', with a stylized, looped initial 'J' and a long horizontal stroke extending to the right.

John Steinbruner